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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question has long been asked, “How far, if at all, is one 
man bound, being able to do so without serious inconvenience to 
himself, to go out of his way to care for those injured without any 
fault of his?”1  “The problem of rescue is a central issue in the 
 
†  J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Colorado 
College, magna cum laude, 1998. 
 1. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 
1
Nowlin: Don't Just Stand There, Help Me!: Broadening the Effect of Minnes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
NOWLIN-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:26 PM 
1002 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
controversy about the relationship between law and morality.”2  As 
quoted nearly a century ago, “[f]eelings of kindness and sympathy 
may move the Good Samaritan to minister to the sick and wounded 
at the roadside, but the law imposes no such obligation; and 
suffering humanity has no legal complaint against those who pass 
by on the other side.”3 
A Good Samaritan generally acts out of the kindness of his 
heart,4 and historically the law hesitates to impose such an 
obligation on individuals.5  Minnesota, however, has gone against 
the grain and created a statutory duty to render assistance at the 
scene of an emergency.6  The immunity associated with that 
statutory duty was challenged in Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance 
Co., in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly granted 
immunity to a Good Samaritan providing transportation to an 
injured girl.7 
This note first explores the history highlighting the difference 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance.8  Next, it describes the 
historical lack of recognition of a duty to aid another and the 
liability of volunteers to those they help.9  Then the note observes 
the states’ recognition of the public policy issue of encouraging 
individuals to render assistance in emergencies, and the states’ 
adoption of Good Samaritan laws granting immunity to such 
volunteers.10  Next, it describes the elements that Minnesota’s case 
law has historically required before a duty to assist is recognized,11 
followed by a description of the imposition of a statutory duty to 
assist.12  The Swenson case is described next.13  The note ends with 
 
56 U. PA. L. REV., 217, 217 (1908)). 
 2. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 293 
(1980). 
 3. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (quoting 
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)). 
 4. See Luke 10:30-37.  The parable tells the story of the Good Samaritan, who 
was the only one of three passers-by who came to the aid of a man who was beaten, 
robbed, and left by the side of the road.  Id.  The Good Samaritan took the 
downtrodden individual to an inn and paid for his stay there without expecting 
anything in return.  Id. 
 5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
 6. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002). 
 7. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 12. See infra Part II.D.2. 
2
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an analysis of the Swenson decision, including an alternative 
method of resolving the case and supporting law from other 
states.14 
II. HISTORY 
A.  Misfeasance and Nonfeasance 
Early writers noted that “[t]here is no distinction more deeply 
rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that 
between misfeasance and non-feasance.”15  Misfeasance differs from 
nonfeasance in form of conduct: misfeasance is “active misconduct 
working positive injury to others” while nonfeasance is “a failure to 
take positive steps to benefit others.”16 
The victim is clearly worse off due to the wrongful act in cases 
of active misfeasance.17  “In cases of passive inaction [the] plaintiff 
is . . . no worse off at all . . . . [H]e is merely deprived of a 
protection which, had it been afforded him, would have benefited 
him.”18  The defendant has left him just as he was, neither better off 
nor in no worse condition.19  It is a loss only in the sense that the 
plaintiff was not given something.20 
To help clarify the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance, the suggestion is to focus not on the moment the 
defendant failed to act to prevent harm to the plaintiff, but at the 
course of events prior to that moment.21  If there is no significant 
interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant prior to that 
moment, the defendant’s conduct can be considered to be 
nonfeasance.22  Participation by the defendant in the creation of 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 219.  “This distinction is founded on that attitude 
of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.”  Id. at 220.  “The 
primary conception of the common law was that which regarded the individual as 
competent to protect himself if not interfered with from without.”  Id. at 221. 
 16. Id. at 219. 
 17. Id. at 220. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 221.  Other writers have elaborated on those earlier notions.  See 
generally Weinrib, supra note 2, at 251-58 (elaborating on Professor Bohlen’s 
theories). 
 21. Weinrib, supra note 2, at 253. 
 22. Id. at 253-54.  Professor Weinrib gives the example of two different 
scenarios: a car driver not pressing the brake and striking a pedestrian, and a pool 
3
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the risk is thus the crucial factor in distinguishing misfeasance from 
nonfeasance.23 
B.  The Duty to Protect or Aid Others 
1.  No Duty to Aid, No Liability for Harm 
Generally, there is no duty to protect or come to the aid of 
another in peril.24  “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize 
that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection 
does not of itself impose upon him to take such action.”25  No duty 
exists even if the danger to the other is great and the trouble of 
aiding him is minimal.26  “Those duties which are dictated merely 
by good morals or by humane considerations are not within the 
domain of the law.”27  The argument in favor of recognizing moral 
obligations as valid legal claims was rejected by courts on the 
grounds that such recognition would destabilize written law by 
replacing it with the varied morals of those sitting on the bench.28 
A duty to protect or aid another may exist if the parties 
 
patron not throwing a rope to a drowning person.  Id. at 253.  Looking only at the 
moment of injury, both situations pose instances of nonfeasance; the driver failed 
to press the brake, and the observer failed to throw a rope.  Id.  Looking to the 
events leading up to the injury, however, the driver created the conditions resulting 
in injury, while the pool patron did nothing to cause the drowning.  Id.  With this 
analysis, Professor Weinrib suggests that the car driver is guilty of misfeasance 
while the pool patron’s conduct is nonfeasance.  Id.; see also Newton v. Ellis, 119 
Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855) (holding that one who dug a hole near a road and 
failed to light it at night was guilty of misfeasance because the inaction (failure to 
light the hole) was preceded by an act (digging the hole)). 
 23. Weinrib, supra note 2, at 256. 
 24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
 25. Id.  Courts in the early 1900s recognized this rule and were hesitant to 
change moral obligations into legal duties.  See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 
P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903) (“For withholding relief from the suffering, for failure to 
respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of 
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the laws of men, but 
in that higher law . . . .”). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).  The rule 
applies “irrespective of the gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected 
and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or 
protection.”  Id.  See also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 114 (2003) (explaining the 
rules of assisting others). 
 27. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (citing Union 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)). 
 28. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903). 
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involved have a special relationship.29  Four primary special 
relationships are recognized: that between a common carrier and a 
passenger, between an innkeeper and a guest, between a 
landowner and those upon his land by his invitation, and between 
one who takes custody of another either voluntarily or as required 
by law.30 
The duty to protect another in a special relationship arises 
only when the relationship exists and the harm develops in the 
course of that relationship.31  However, absent a special relationship 
or the termination of an existing special relationship, a party is 
under no duty to protect or aid the other.32  “Unless a relation 
exists between the sick . . . and those who witness their distress 
[requiring them to provide] the necessary relief, there is neither 
legal obligation to minister on the one hand, nor cause for legal 
complaint on the other.”33 
2.  Recognizing Liability for Harm 
Liability for bodily harm to another will be recognized when, 
having no prior duty to do so, an actor takes charge of another who 
is helpless.34  The actor in such a situation will be subject to liability 
for injury to the other when the actor fails to exercise reasonable 
care to secure the safety of the imperiled person, or when the actor 
discontinues aid or protection and leaves the victim in a worse 
position.35  It would seem, then, that given such potential for 
liability if the rescue goes awry, a possible rescuer might rethink his 
intent to render assistance at the scene of an emergency. 
Legal writers find decisions following the general rule of no 
duty to aid or protect revolting to moral sense.36  In fact, at least 
 
 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. cmt. c. 
 32. Id. (“A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased 
to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or 
endangered while he is away from the premises.”). 
 33. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (citing Union 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)). 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965). 
 35. Id. 
 36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 
(5th ed. 1984); see also Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that a 
moral, not a legal, duty to aid existed when defendant watched plaintiff 
drowning); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-13 (1908) 
(“We should all be better satisfied if the man who refuses to throw a rope to a 
5
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one author believes the law should reflect general moral 
obligations.37  Consequently, it has been written that eventually 
“such extreme cases of morally outrageous behavior and 
indefensible conduct will arise that there will be further inroads 
upon the older rule.”38 
C.  The Good Samaritan Law 
Little evidence exists that documents how frequently 
individuals assist at scenes of emergencies involving strangers.39  
However, some authors give reasons to explain the perceived 
hesitancy of individuals to help in apparent emergencies.40  
Consequently, Good Samaritan statutes were created for the 
purpose of encouraging prompt emergency care by granting 
statutory immunity from civil damages and removing the fear of 
liability.41 
The statutes are designed to protect individuals from civil 
liability for any negligent acts or omissions committed while 
providing emergency care.42  Such statutes attempt to eliminate the 
perceived inadequacies of the common-law rule under which a 
volunteer, assisting an injured person with no prior duty to do so, 
was liable for failing to exercise reasonable care in providing the 
 
drowning man or to save a helpless child on the railroad track could be punished 
and be made to compensate [those who are injured] . . . [I]t is hard to see why 
such a rule should not be declared by statute, if not by the courts.”); Charles O. 
Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE GOOD 
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, 23, 27 (James Ratcliffe ed., 1981) [hereinafter 
SAMARITAN] (characterizing a court decision holding motorists involved in a crash 
liable for not warning others of the blocked road as a “childishly simple” advance 
over the general common law duty); Weinrib, supra note 2, at 247. 
 37. See Antony M. Honoré, Law, Morals and Rescue, in SAMARITAN, supra note 
36, at 225, 238-39 (recognizing the advantage to those who would benefit from 
such a rule, and stating that such a change would correct the layman’s feeling that 
the law is “like an overpermissive father . . . set[ting] its standard too low”). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965). 
 39. Lawrence Z. Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in SAMARITAN, supra 
note 36, at 171; Joseph Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in 
SAMARITAN, supra note 36, at 183, 185. 
 40. See Herbert Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship, in 
SAMARITAN, supra note 36, at 213, 213-14 (describing how people might not 
interfere in strangers’ affairs out of fear of being wrong in their assessment of the 
situation); Freedman, supra note 39, at 171, 176-181 (pointing to apprehension, 
acquiescence, and aggression as reasons that people do not get involved). 
 41. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good 
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294, 299-300 (1989). 
 42. Id. 
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assistance.43  In fact, some state legislatures clearly state that the 
intent in creating such a statute is to encourage health care 
practitioners, who are not “on the job” at the time, to provide 
necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation.44 
The first Good Samaritan statute was passed in 195945 in 
California.46  Since then, all states have enacted some form of Good 
Samaritan legislation.47  Many Good Samaritan statutes require that 
the volunteer act in good faith in order to be eligible for immunity; 
the rescuer must not have received anything for his efforts or 
participated with the expectation of receiving any benefit.48  This 
requirement is consistent with the definition of a “Good 
Samaritan.”49 
 
 43. Id.; see supra Part II.B.2. 
 44. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(c)(3) (West 2003). 
 45. Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 46. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1507 (currently codified as amended at CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2003)). 
 47. Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A 
Current Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 303 (1983); see ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2003); 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (Michie 2002) (amended 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-
2263 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
108 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801 
(2002); FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (2003); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
49/1-75 (2003); IND. CODE § 34-30-12-1 (West 2003); IOWA CODE § 613.17 (2002); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891 (2002) (amended 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.148 
(2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164 
(West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 112, § 12B (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1501 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. § 
604A.01 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.037 
(2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,186 (2002); 
NEV. REV. STAT. 41.500 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12 (2002); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-3 (2003); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§ 3000-a (2003) (amended 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.14 (2003); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 32-03.1-02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
76, § 5 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8331 (2003); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-27.1 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 20-9-4.1 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-218 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 74.152 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22 (2003); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4.24.300 (West 2003) (amended 2003); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (2003); WIS. 
STAT. § 895.48 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-120 (2002) (amended 2003). 
 48. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2003) (“gratuitously and in good faith”); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-21-108 (2003) (“without compensation”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
663-1.5 (2003) (“without remuneration or expectation of remuneration”). 
 49. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 822 (2d ed. 2001) 
(“[A] person who gratuitously gives help or sympathy to those in distress.”); see also 
supra note 4. 
7
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Not all Good Samaritan statutes are the same, though; some 
provide protection to a narrow class of individuals, while others 
protect a broader class of people.50  For example, some states have 
chosen to protect only individuals licensed or certified in the 
medical field.51 Other states apply the Good Samaritan immunity to 
a slightly larger group of individuals;52 still others protect “any 
person.”53 
States also differ in the general language and terms used in 
their Good Samaritan statutes.54  While all states protect the 
volunteer’s act of rendering assistance, they differ in describing the 
scope of the protected conduct.55  While some Good Samaritan 
statutes protect individuals acting in or at the scene of an 
“emergency,” others protect actions at the scene of an “accident.”56  
Some statutes include both terms.57  Legislatures have tried to 
reduce ambiguity through definition.58  Others use neither 
 
 50. Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 51. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12B (2003) (protecting 
physicians, physician assistants, and registered or licensed nurses); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 691.1501 sec.1(1) (West 2003) (same). 
 52. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891(e) (2002) (amended 2003) 
(protecting any person licensed to practice in any branch of the healing arts); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 537.037(1)-(2) (2002) (protecting licensed physicians and surgeons, 
registered or licensed nurses, and any person trained to provide first aid in a 
standard recognized training program). 
 53. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(a) (Michie 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300(1) (West 2003). 
 54. See generally Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 55. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5(a)(2) (2002) (protecting volunteer acts of 
artificial respiration, restoration of breathing, preventing blood loss, or restoring 
heart action or circulation of blood) with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
603(a) (2003) (protecting persons giving any assistance or medical care) 
(emphasis added). 
 56. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22(1) (2003) (emergency) with IDAHO 
CODE § 5-330 (2003) (accident).  It seems “emergency” is a broader term than 
“accident.”  For example, the Utah legislature’s definition of “emergency” 
includes, among other things, “accidents.”  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22(1) 
(2003).  The inference may fairly be drawn that while an emergency could involve 
an accident, not all accidents are emergencies. 
 57. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(a) (Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 
51-1-29 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (2003) (scene of an accident, fire, 
or any life-threatening emergency); WIS. STAT. § 895.48(1) (2003). 
 58. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2003) (defining the scene 
of an emergency as including, “but not limited to, the emergency rooms of 
hospitals in the event of a medical disaster”); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2(b) 
(2002) (defining the scene of emergency as “an area outside the confines of a 
hospital or other institution that has hospital facilities”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-
22(1) (2003) (defining emergency as “an unexpected occurrence involving injury, 
threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public”). 
8
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“emergency” nor “accident,” opting rather to describe the 
characteristics of an imperiled person, thereby implying an 
emergency situation.59  A different approach is to specify locations 
where Good Samaritan immunity will not apply.60 
The statutes typically define the standard of care the volunteer 
must exercise to be eligible for immunity,61 although some simply 
protect volunteers from liability resulting from any acts or 
omissions when rendering assistance.62  One definition requires the 
individual to act as a reasonable and prudent person.63  Most 
statutes immunize volunteers against their ordinary negligence 
when assisting a victim, but do not protect against conduct that 
indicates gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.64 
The most noticeable difference between the general rule 
regarding coming to another’s aid and Good Samaritan statutes is 
that the general rule defines the liability of one who aids another 
 
 59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002) (protecting acts of assistance 
given “to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance, 
or any person in obvious physical distress or discomfort”). 
 60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(a) (West 2003) (specifying that the 
statutory immunity applies to assistance “at the scene of an emergency outside of a 
hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment”); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164 (West 2003) (stating the immunity “shall not apply if 
such first aid or emergency treatment or assistance is rendered on the premises of 
a hospital or clinic”).  Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (Michie 2002) (providing 
immunity to “a person at a hospital or any other location” who renders assistance). 
 61. See Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 62. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 
12B (2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-15 (2003). 
 63. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
768.13(2)(a) (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603(c)(1) 
(2003).  It may seem peculiar that some states have decided to codify the common 
law rule.  Further scrutiny of those statutes yields reasonable justifications for the 
legislative action.  For example, the Florida statute lumps medical professionals 
together with all other citizens, so the reasonableness standard seems to operate 
primarily to shield medical professionals from liability, encouraging them to assist 
at the scene of an emergency.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(a) (West 2003).  
The Arkansas statute holds ordinary citizens to the reasonableness standard, but 
restricts their ability to act, most notably by allowing such individuals to provide 
only such assistance as is needed.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(b)(3) (Michie 
2002).  The Maryland statute operates in much the same way.  See MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603(c)(3) (2003).  By granting immunity for the common 
law rule, most everyone could claim that immunity.  It seems, therefore, that the 
states attempted to counteract that imbalance by restricting the types of conduct 
for which a person could claim the immunity. 
 64. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-
12-1(b) (West 2003). 
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without a prior duty to do so,65 while Good Samaritan statutes 
protect rescuers from such liability.66  In addition, the standard of 
care imposed on an actor under the general rule is that of 
reasonable care,67 while Good Samaritan statutes generally protect 
even negligent actions.68  However, some Good Samaritan statutes 
diverge from the common law rule in another, more significant 
way: they create a statutory duty to render assistance to individuals 
in danger.69 
D.  Minnesota and the Duty to Aid 
1.  Common Law History 
Minnesota is one of only three states that have created a 
statutory duty to render assistance to others who are in peril.70  
Minnesota first tackled the issue of whether one has a duty to 
render aid or protection in Depue v. Flateau.71  In Depue a cattle 
buyer stopped at a farmer’s house to purchase cattle.72  While on 
the premises, the buyer became quite ill and asked to spend the 
night, but was refused.73  After the buyer awakened from a fainting 
spell, the farmer escorted him to his cutter74 and sent him off the 
property.75  A passer-by found the buyer by the roadside early the 
next morning suffering from frostbite and other ailments; he had 
become sick on the ride and fallen from his vehicle during the 
night.76 
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
action, finding that the farmer may have owed a duty to the buyer.77  
The court held: 
 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965). 
 66. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965). 
 68. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714(1) (2002). 
 69. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002). 
 70. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2003); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); see generally Gabriel C.M. Ciociola, Misprision of 
Felony and Its Progeny, 41 Brandeis L.J. 697, 735-36 (2003). 
 71. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907). 
 72. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 1. 
 73. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 2. 
 74. A cutter is “a small, light sleigh, usually single seated and pulled by one 
horse.”  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 2001). 
 75. Depue, 100 Minn. at 301-02, 111 N.W. at 2. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 305, 111 N.W. at 3. 
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[W]henever a person is placed in such a position with 
regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does not use 
due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that 
person, the duty at once arises to exercise care 
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds 
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such 
danger; and a negligent failure to perform the duty 
renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.78 
The court further noted that the rule “applies with greater 
strictness to conduct towards persons under disability, and imposes 
the obligation as a matter of law, not mere sentiment, at least to 
refrain from any affirmative action that might result in injury to 
them.”79  The rule was focused on the parties having a special 
relationship.80  A crucial aspect of the rule is the actor’s knowledge 
and appreciation of the imperiled person’s condition.81  However, 
the court stressed the fact that the farmer had no absolute duty to 
entertain the buyer, only that the farmer could not make the buyer 
any worse off.82 
The Minnesota Supreme Court handled a related situation 
involving injury and emergency care in the same year as Depue.83  
Shaw v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. was an action for negligence in 
which a conductor missed a train and required a brakeman to go 
on top of the train to stop it, which ultimately led to the 
brakeman’s death.84  However, the court briefly considered the test 
for negligence to be applied in a situation where one renders 
 
 78. Id. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2. 
 79. Id. at 304, 111 N.W. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2 (stating the principle applies to situations arising 
from “noncontract relations,” such as that between a landowner and a trespasser 
or invitee, and noting that the buyer was on the farm at the invitation of the 
farmer).  The court also noted that “[t]hose entering the premises of another by 
invitation are entitled to a higher degree of care than those who are present by 
mere sufferance.”  Id.  The special relationship in Depue has been construed as one 
where a party controls the circumstances or is in charge of another.  See Tiedeman 
v. Morgan, 435 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Regan v. Stromberg, 285 
N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. 1979). 
 81. Depue, 100 Minn. at 305, 111 N.W. at 3 (“If defendants knew and 
appreciated his condition, their act in sending him out . . . was wrongful and 
rendered them liable in damages.”). 
 82. Id. at 304-05, 111 N.W. at 3.  The court seemed to bridge law and morals 
by stating, “the law, as well as humanity, required that he be not exposed in his 
helpless condition to the merciless elements.”  Id. at 304, 111 N.W. at 3. 
 83. Shaw v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 8, 114 N.W. 85 (1907). 
 84. Id. at 8-11, 114 N.W. at 85-86. 
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emergency care to another.85  The court held that, under the 
circumstances, the rescuer must show a purpose to help relieve the 
victim at the earliest moment.86 
2.  Development of the Good Samaritan Law 
Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law was introduced in 1971.87  
The legislation created an immunity for a person “who in good 
faith and in the exercise of reasonable care renders emergency 
care at the scene of an emergency.”88  However, even after the 
Good Samaritan law providing immunity to volunteers was enacted, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court continued to recognize the necessity 
of a special relationship in order to give rise to a duty to protect.89  
Therefore, although they would have immunity for their less-than-
reckless acts when rendering aid to another in an emergency, 
individuals would not be required to act unless a special relationship 
existed to give rise to that duty. 
The Good Samaritan statute was subsequently amended in 
1983 to create a statutory duty to render reasonable assistance at 
the scene of an emergency.90  It would seem this amendment was 
passed in an effort to promote assistance at the scenes of 
emergencies.  By creating a statutory duty to render assistance to 
another with no preexisting duty or special relationship, the 
legislature effectively countered the holding of Depue that had been 
judicially recognized for more than seventy years.91  This statutory 
duty, coupled with the statutory immunity for rendering aid at the 
 
 85. Id. at 12, 114 N.W. at 86. 
 86. Id. (“It must be remembered that the proper test is, not what occurs to a 
person subsequently, upon mature deliberation, but whether, under the 
circumstances, the conductor showed an evident purpose to do what he could, in 
good faith, to relieve the sufferer at the earliest moment.”) (emphasis added).  
Strikingly, the court used language in the rule that would later be used in the first 
version of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statutes.  See Good Samaritan Law, ch. 218, 
1971 Minn. Laws 425 (1971) (noting the actor’s good faith intent). 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1971) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 
(2002)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Regan v. Stromberg, 285 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. 1979) (holding as a 
correct summary of the law a jury instruction that states “where one . . . takes 
charge of another . . . then the person in charge must use reasonable care to 
prevent [harm]”). 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 604.05, subd. 1 (1983). 
 91. Compare § 604.05, subd. 1 with Depue v. Flateau , 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 
1 (1907) and Regan v. Stromberg, 285 N.W.2d 97 (Minn. 1979). 
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scene of an emergency, is essentially how the statute stands today.92 
The supreme court had the opportunity to analyze the Good 
Samaritan law in Tiedeman v. Morgan.93  The facts of Tiedeman are 
similar to those of Depue.94  Tiedeman, the boyfriend of the 
defendants’ daughter, was at the defendants’ house watching 
movies one evening.95  The defendants were aware that Tiedeman 
had heart ailments and that he had undergone heart surgery.96  
While watching movies with the defendants’ daughter, Tiedeman 
became ill, prompting his girlfriend to call 911.97  Defendants 
cancelled that call for help, claiming Tiedeman said he was fine.98  
Defendants alleged Tiedeman refused a second offer to go to the 
hospital.99  Twenty minutes later, Tiedeman’s girlfriend screamed 
for help because Tiedeman’s condition worsened.100  An ambulance 
was summoned, but Tiedeman had suffered severe and irreparable 
brain damage due to lack of oxygen.101  The injury could have been 
avoided with earlier treatment.102 
 
 92. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002).  The pertinent subdivisions now read: 
Subdivision 1.  Duty to assist.  A person at the scene of an emergency 
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave 
physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without 
danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person.  Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or 
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.  
A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 
Subd. 2.  General immunity from liability.  (a) A person who, without 
compensation or the expectation of compensation, renders emergency 
care, advice, or assistance at the scene of an emergency or during 
transit to a location where professional medical care can be rendered, 
is not liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by that 
person in rendering the emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless 
the person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in providing 
the care, advice, or assistance.  This subdivision does not apply to a 
person rendering emergency care, advice, or assistance during the 
course of regular employment, and receiving compensation or 
expecting to receive compensation for rendering the care, advice, or 
assistance. 
§ 604A.01, subd. (1)-(2). 
 93. 435 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 87. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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Tiedeman sued the defendants, claiming they negligently 
attended to him or interfered with efforts to assist him.103  The trial 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that 
“they were entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statute, 
and that the evidence did not support an exception to such 
immunity for wanton or reckless rendering of care.”104  The 
appellate court recognized the Good Samaritan law, but found it 
inapplicable in this case.105  The Tiedeman court relied on Depue in 
its analysis to establish that defendants had a preexisting legal duty 
to Tiedeman.106  The court continued by saying that, although it 
recognized the immunity provision of the Good Samaritan law, 
“[n]evertheless, it is evident that the rendering of care which is 
addressed by the statute is that course of conduct which has not 
historically involved a recognized legal duty.”107  Consequently, the 
lower court’s decision, which rested upon the immunity provided 
by the Good Samaritan statute, was reversed.108 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals further clarified the role of 
the Good Samaritan law in Johnson v. Thompson Motors of Wykoff, 
Inc.109  The plaintiff in Johnson alleged the defendant business was 
negligent in not protecting him from the violence of a recently 
fired employee.110  The district court relied on the Good Samaritan 
law to find the defendant guilty of not providing reasonable 
assistance at the scene of an emergency.111  The appellate court 
reversed the decision, noting that the plaintiff’s claim was not for 
failure to render reasonable assistance, but for failure to warn 
customers in advance.112  The court thereby focused the Good 
Samaritan law’s application to present or existing emergencies, not 
future emergencies.113 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 88. 
 106. Id. at 88-89. 
 107. Id. at 89. 
 108. Id. 
 109. No. C1-99-666, 2000 WL 136076 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2000). 
 110. Id. at *1.  The plaintiff was a customer at defendant’s business. 
 111. Id. at *2.  The former employee, Dan Copeman, returned to Thompson 
Motors with a gun, and shot and killed Van Johnson.  Id. at *1. 
 112. Id. at *2. 
 113. See id. (“Thompson Motors had no statutory duty to render ‘assistance’ 
before Johnson was shot.”) (emphasis added). 
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III. CASE DESCRIPTION 
A recent challenge to Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law 
occurred in Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
A.  Facts 
Kelly Swenson, thirteen years old, injured her leg in a 
snowmobile accident near a highway.114  Swenson’s sister and three 
friends were with her.115  Lillian Tiegs drove by the scene, stopping 
her van when the group signaled her for help.116  Discovering 
Swenson’s injury, Tiegs tried to call 911 on her cell phone, but the 
phone was inoperable.117  Tiegs agreed to drive Swenson to the 
hospital.118  However, Tiegs decided to first drive back to her house, 
less than a quarter of a mile away from the accident, allowing the 
rest of Swenson’s group to park their snowmobiles on Tiegs’ 
property and accompany Swenson to the hospital.119 
Once Swenson was placed in Tiegs’ van, Tiegs attempted to 
make a U-turn from the westbound side of the highway to the 
eastbound side.120  During the maneuver a tractor-trailer exceeding 
the speed limit struck the passenger side of Tiegs’ van.121  Swenson 
died as a result of the injuries sustained in the crash.122 
B.  The District Court’s Analysis 
Swenson’s family brought a wrongful-death action against both 
the truck driver and Tiegs.123  The family settled with the truck 
driver124 and proceeded to bring an underinsured-motorist claim 
against Waseca Mutual, Tiegs’ insurer.125  The insurer moved for 
 
 114. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 795-96. 
 118. Id. at 796. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  The purpose of underinsured motorist statutes is to “provide 
insurance protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent 
motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in the amount of the 
15
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summary judgment, claiming that Tiegs was immune from liability 
under Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law.126  The district court 
granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the Good 
Samaritan law does not require the injured person to be in “grave 
physical harm.”127 The court also concluded that Tiegs had 
otherwise satisfied the statutory requirements and was entitled to 
immunity.128 
C.  The Appellate Court’s Analysis 
1.  Is Driving an Injured Person from the Scene of an Accident to 
a Health-Care Facility Protected Under the Good Samaritan 
Statute? 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals faced two issues of first 
impression.129  The court first had to determine whether the Good 
Samaritan law provides immunity from a negligence claim where a 
layperson attempts to transport an injured person from the scene 
of an accident to a health-care facility.130  Emphasis was placed 
upon construing the statute in the manner intended by the 
legislature131 and not creating a judicial construction.132 
 
underinsured policy.”  7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 37 (2003).  It is in the 
public interest to give one injured in an auto accident access to insurance 
protection to compensate for damages that would have been recoverable if the 
underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance.  
Id.  Once an insured sustains injuries in a motor vehicle accident with an 
underinsured motorist, the insured can recover damages from her own insurer.  
See id. § 311.  Minnesota requires motor vehicle owners to maintain underinsured 
motorist coverage.  MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(2) (2002).  Because Swenson 
was occupying Tiegs’ vehicle at the time of the accident, Swenson’s limit of liability 
was the limit specified for Tiegs’ vehicle.  See § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5).  See generally 
MICHAEL K. STEENSON, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 15.09 (3d 
ed. 2002) (explaining how an injured person must proceed with a claim against an 
underinsured motorist). 
 126. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 796. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 796-97.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002) (requiring courts to 
look to the language of the statute to determine its meaning and “ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the legislature”); Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 360 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that substantive policy concerns and legislative 
intent must be examined in order to determine the meaning of a statute). 
 132. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co, 653 N.W.2d 794, 797 (citing Occhino v. 
Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“If the meaning of a statute 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/10
NOWLIN-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:26 PM 
2004] DON’T JUST STAND THERE, HELP ME! 1017 
Swenson’s family argued that the “during transit” portion of 
the Good Samaritan law protects only those who provide 
emergency care while the injured person is being transported to a 
health-care facility, not to those merely driving the vehicle that 
carries the person.133  The court recognized that the purpose of the 
statute is to encourage laypersons to help others in need even when 
no legal duty to do so exists.134  In addition to looking to other 
states’ analysis for guidance,135 the court reasoned that the 
proffered construction was too narrow and offered little protection 
to laypersons.136  Because the alternative contradicted the purpose 
of the statute, the court concluded that the “during transit” 
provision provides immunity to “laypersons whose only act of 
assistance is to drive a person from the scene of an emergency to a 
health-care facility.”137  Therefore, the court found Tiegs was 
protected by the Good Samaritan law.138 
2.  Is It an “Emergency” If the Actor Providing Transportation to 
a Health-Care Facility Makes a Brief Stop on the Way? 
Swenson’s family also argued that Tiegs did not face an 
emergency as required by the Good Samaritan law because she did 
not plan to go directly from the scene of the accident to a 
hospital.139  The family also implied that because a life-threatening 
injury did not exist, there was no emergency.140 
The court acknowledged that “emergency” had not been 
defined by statute or case law in the context of the Good Samaritan 
 
is plain and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction is neither necessary nor 
proper.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 798.  The court observed the treatment of the Good Samaritan law 
under similar circumstances in Washington, see Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 
P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Massachusetts, see Campbell v. Schwartz, 712 
N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); and New Mexico, see Dahl v. Turner, 458 P.2d 
816 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).  Id. 
 136. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 799.  Because professional emergency technicians 
are not protected by the Good Samaritan law while on the job due to their 
preexisting duty to provide care, the argument provided by Swenson’s family 
would protect only laypersons providing emergency care in a vehicle in transit to a 
health care facility while a third person drives.  Id. at 798-99. 
 137. Id. at 799. 
 138. Id. at 800. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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law.141  However, case law broadly defines an “emergency” as “any 
event or occasional combination of circumstances which calls for 
immediate action or remedy.”142  The court declared “coming upon 
a roadside personal-injury-accident scene is the epitome of an 
emergency.”143  The court thus followed the lead of other states that 
have defined an “emergency.”144  The court concluded that, 
because Swenson was in a great deal of pain and needed immediate 
medical assistance, Tiegs was at the scene of an emergency.145 
When deciding whether the victim must be suffering from 
grave or life-threatening injuries, the court looked to the language 
of the clause granting immunity.146  The statute does not require 
such injuries; it requires only that a person render assistance at the 
scene of an emergency.147  In addition, the argument posed by 
Swenson’s family would require laypersons to determine the 
severity of a victim’s injuries before offering assistance.148  
Furthermore, the argument ignores the probability that less serious 
injuries, left untreated, may become more serious.149  The court 
then found that when Tiegs came upon the scene she had no way 
of knowing the extent of Swenson’s injuries, she could not contact 
help, and immediate action was necessary.150  Concluding that the 
slight delay from the planned indirect route to the hospital did not 
lessen the emergency, the court found Tiegs’ actions were 
protected by the Good Samaritan law.151 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (citing Gust v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 486 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 799-800.  The court observed the definitions of “emergency” as laid 
out by cases in Utah, see Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524, 1530 (10th Cir. 
1990); Washington, see Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312, 1319 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1988); and Illinois, see Rivera v. Arana, 749 N.E.2d 434, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001).  Id. 
 145. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 800. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  To further its rejection of the argument, the court noted that the 
likelihood of more serious injuries would increase under such an interpretation.  
Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  Required Definitions 
Before analyzing the Swenson court’s decision on Minnesota’s 
Good Samaritan law, it is necessary to have definitions of the 
important terms involved: namely, what is an “emergency” and 
what is a “Good Samaritan?”  The term “emergency” may have 
three different meanings, depending on the source consulted.  
According to common usage, an emergency is “[a] sudden, urgent, 
usually unexpected occurrence or occasion requiring immediate 
action; a state, especially of need for help or relief, created by some 
unexpected event.”152  A legal dictionary defines an emergency as 
“[c]onfrontation by sudden peril; . . . a pressing necessity; an 
exigency; an event or occasional combination of circumstances 
calling for immediate action.”153  Minnesota case law has recognized 
an emergency as “a situation which has suddenly and unexpectedly 
arisen and which requires speedy action.”154  The element common 
to all three definitions is a suddenness or unexpectedness to the 
situation.  The other required information is a definition of a Good 
Samaritan.  A Good Samaritan is an individual who, out of the 
kindness in his heart, assists others who are downtrodden or 
injured.155 
Applying these basic definitions to Minnesota’s Good 
Samaritan law (which requires individuals to assist at the scene of 
an emergency), it seems counterintuitive to force someone, out of 
the goodness in his heart, to help another in danger.  Perhaps that 
is why the overwhelming majority of the states has elected to forgo 
legislation requiring individuals to act at the scene of an 
emergency;156 forced volunteerism is not logical, and it may not be 
in the public’s best interest. 
B.  Liberal vs. Narrow Interpretation of the Statute 
The next step of the analysis is to look at how Minnesota courts 
 
 152. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 636 (2d ed. 2001). 
 153. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (3d ed. 1969). 
 154. Gust v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 486 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 155. See supra notes 4, 49 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  Forty-seven states do not have a 
statutory clause creating a duty to assist.  Id. 
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typically handle “duty” issues.  Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp.157  is a 
good example of how the Minnesota Supreme Court handled a 
question of duty.  Funchess involved a question of a landlord’s duty 
to protect an apartment tenant from a criminal attack by a third 
party.158  Although Funchess is distinguishable from Swenson because 
Funchess involved parties to a more business-like transaction, the 
focus of the court’s analysis on the question of “duty” is on point.159  
After restating the general common law rule of no duty to aid or 
protect, and citing the exceptions of special relationships, the court 
ultimately concluded that “whether a special relationship and its 
concomitant duty exists is a question of policy.”160  The court added, 
however, “[w]e are generally cautious and reluctant to impose a 
duty to protect between those conducting business with one 
another.”161 
Analyzing the Swenson decision through the lens of Funchess 
brings a question to mind: How should the court construe the 
Good Samaritan statute?  By broadly construing the Good 
Samaritan immunity, the court may indirectly broaden the 
associated duty to render assistance.  The court may find it easier to 
conclude that the duty to assist existed if the potential rescuer was 
largely protected.  In other words, the court may reason that the 
more one is protected from liability for his acts, the more willing 
the court should be to make him act by imposing a duty. 
It seems, therefore, the court can choose only one of two 
paths: follow the judicial trend and be “cautious and reluctant”162 to 
impose a duty by narrowly construing the Good Samaritan 
immunity, or follow the apparent legislative purpose behind the 
statute163 and construe the immunity broadly.  The Swenson court 
seemingly followed the legislative purpose of the law’s enactment 
and broadly construed the immunity of Minnesota’s Good 
Samaritan statute.164  The reason for this seems clear and 
 
 157. 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001). 
 158. See id. at 671. 
 159. See id. at 673. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added).  The court went on to state that “[f]urther, we must 
consider the relative costs and benefits of imposing a duty.”  Id. at n.4. 
 161. Id. at 674. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002); Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 164. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 799-800 (holding that emergency care rendered 
“during transit” includes the mere act of driving an injured person to a medical 
location, and that since the statute does not require a certain severity of injury, 
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appropriate: Funchess involved a situation between parties 
unaffected by statute, requiring only judicial interpretation of any 
special relationship involved, while Swenson involved a situation 
potentially falling within the bounds of a statute.  The Swenson 
court noted that, once a case falls within a statute, “[t]he canons of 
construction also demand that substantive policy concerns and 
legislative intent be examined in order to determine the meaning of 
the statute.”165  Consequently, the court was not at liberty to 
construe the Good Samaritan statute in a way preferred by the 
court, but was required to construe it in the manner that would 
give it the effect intended by the legislature. 
C.  An Easier Method of Resolving the Dispute 
The appellate court made resolution of the dispute in Swenson 
more difficult than necessary.  The court seemed to be sidetracked 
by Swenson’s argument that the “during transit” provision of the 
Good Samaritan statute applies only to care rendered beyond the 
mere act of driving, thereby implying that the care rendered must 
be medical in nature.166  The court then focused on the “during 
transit” provision of the statute, comparing the relative duties of 
medical technicians and non-emergency personnel, as well as 
restating the policy behind the statute.167 
The dispute could have been resolved in Tiegs’ favor with far 
more ease simply by analyzing the elements required for Good 
Samaritan immunity, defining a required term, and comparing that 
information to the facts of the case.  To begin, in addition to 
receiving no compensation and not acting in a reckless manner, an 
actor at the scene of an emergency is granted immunity for 
“render[ing] emergency care, advice, or assistance.”168  The most 
basic of the three elements is “assistance.” “Assistance” is defined as 
“help; aid; support.”169  If this most basic element is met, along with 
the other statutory requirements for immunity, the analysis need 
not go any further. 
Therefore, under this analysis, the court could have simply 
 
care for any injury will suffice as long as it is at the scene of an emergency). 
 165. Id. at 797 (emphasis added) (citing Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 
360 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 166. See id. at 798. 
 167. Id. at 798-99. 
 168. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 169. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 126 (2d ed. 2001). 
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asked: did Tiegs render emergency assistance?  The answer must be 
yes.  Once she saw the girls signaling her for help for the injured 
Swenson,170 Tiegs had come upon an unexpected situation that 
required her speedy or immediate action.171  She provided 
emergency assistance by helping Swenson get to a medical facility.  
Whether Tiegs gave Swenson medical assistance is irrelevant; the 
statute only requires that an actor who seeks to be protected render 
emergency assistance.172 
D.  Interpretation of the Good Samaritan Law in Other States 
Because Swenson brought to light two issues of first impression 
for the Minnesota Court of Appeals, it is helpful to observe the 
treatment of the Good Samaritan law in other states.  However, it is 
critical to note that the treatment of the statute regarding a case in 
one state will not be the “holy grail” for another state with a 
factually similar case.  The difficulty with comparing such cases 
among states arises because of differences in the states’ Good 
Samaritan statutes.173  It has been noted that decisions in Good 
Samaritan cases turn upon the wording of the statute.174  
Consequently, other states’ decisions provide only guidance, not 
answers. 
1.  Decisions Favoring Good Samaritan Immunity 
Other states’ courts have reached decisions that speak to the 
 
 170. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 795. 
 171. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
 172. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002).  This implication is clear 
because the statute later refers to a “location where professional medical care can 
be rendered.”  § 604A.01, subd. 2. (emphasis added).  Had the legislature 
intended to require that the only protected Good Samaritan acts would be 
medical care, the same terminology would be used throughout the statute.  The 
distinction justifies the inference that protected Good Samaritan acts need not be 
medical in nature.  An example distinguishing emergency assistance from medical 
assistance might start with a person in a burning car.  One who pulls the victim 
from the car would be rendering emergency assistance, while one who tends to the 
victim’s wounds would be rendering medical assistance.  Either form of assistance 
would justify granting immunity under the Good Samaritan statute assuming all 
other requirements are satisfied. 
 173. See supra Part II.C.  For example, the different language used in various 
Good Samaritan statutes gives rise to different areas in which the statute applies 
and different classes of individuals protected by immunity.  See generally Veilleux, 
supra note 41. 
 174. See McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666, 672 (N.D. 2001) (“[T]hose 
decisions are necessarily dependent upon the terminology of a specific statute.”). 
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issue of whether Tiegs was entitled to immunity for merely driving 
Swenson to the hospital.  A North Dakota case shows how easy it 
can be for a court to grant immunity to a volunteer at an accident 
site when public policy dictates as much.175  In McDowell v. Gillie the 
court had to determine whether the act of stopping at the scene of 
a winter accident to inquire whether any assistance was needed 
could constitute rendering aid or assistance under the Good 
Samaritan Act.176  The North Dakota Supreme Court broadly 
defined the term “render” as “[t]o give or make available.”177  The 
court also consulted the broad statutory definition of “aid or 
assistance,” finding that it meant “any actions which the aider 
reasonably believed were required to prevent [injury to the 
victim].”178  Consequently, the court concluded, “the act of 
stopping at the scene of an accident and inquiring whether any 
assistance is needed can constitute the rendering of aid and 
assistance.”179 
While Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statute does not include 
such a broad definition of what constitutes “aid or assistance,”180 
had the Swenson court used the definition of “render” used by the 
McDowell court, Tiegs would have been granted immunity with 
relative ease.  Tiegs certainly “made available” her assistance 
because, unlike the defendants in McDowell who merely stopped at 
the scene of an accident to assess the situation, Tiegs offered to 
give the injured Swenson a ride to the hospital.181 
Flynn v. United States182 came to the same conclusion as the 
court in McDowell.  Park employees approached an accident scene 
and put on their vehicle’s lights and sirens.183  The court found the 
employees had rendered aid or assistance pursuant to the Good 
Samaritan statute.184  The Flynn court liberally applied the statute 
because it held that stopping at the scene of an accident without 
rendering actual physical assistance can constitute rendering 
 
 175. Id. at 671. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01(1) (2001)). 
 179. Id. at 674. 
 180. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002). 
 181. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 182. Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 183. Id. at 1526. 
 184. Id. at 1530. 
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emergency care.185 
The Washington Court of Appeals offers guidance on treating 
the issue of whether a brief stop or delay negates the immunity that 
would otherwise be provided to someone under the Good 
Samaritan law.186  In Youngblood v. Schireman the court dealt with a 
young woman, Youngblood, who was assaulted by her boyfriend in 
his parents’ house.187  His parents gave her a washcloth to clean her 
injuries, and spent the next thirty minutes trying to calm down 
their son.188  Youngblood claimed that her boyfriend’s parents’ 
conduct was grossly negligent or willful or wanton misconduct, and 
they should therefore not be entitled to immunity under 
Washington’s Good Samaritan statute.189  The court defined the 
unprotected conduct as: 
[D]o[ing] an act or intentionally fail[ing] to do an act . . . 
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would 
lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, 
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which 
is necessary to make his conduct negligent.190 
Like Washington’s statute, Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law 
does not protect acts done in a “willful and wanton or reckless 
manner.”191  The Swenson court could have granted Tiegs immunity 
because, using the analysis set forth in Youngblood, there was no 
showing that, in transporting Swenson, Tiegs “intentionally delayed 
taking her to the hospital in reckless disregard of the consequences 
in circumstances in which a reasonable man would have had reason 
to know that such a delay would, to a high degree of probability, 
result in substantial harm to [Swenson].”192 
Finally, a case from Alaska that helps guide courts on the 
general policy issues accompanying the interpretation of Good 
Samaritan statutes is Lee v. State.193  The reasoning in Lee makes it 
easier for other courts to broadly construe such statutes and protect 
individuals without a preexisting duty because “[a] rescuer under a 
 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312 (Wash. 1988). 
 187. Id. at 1313. 
 188. Id. at 1319-20. 
 189. See id. at 1319. 
 190. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)). 
 191. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002). 
 192. Youngblood, 765 P.2d at 1320. 
 193. Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1971). 
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preexisting duty to rescue would not need the added inducement 
of immunity . . . for his ordinary negligence.”194  This reasoning 
justifies a broad interpretation of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan 
statute to grant Tiegs immunity because she had no preexisting 
duty to rescue or aid, and should therefore be protected for policy 
reasons. 
2.  Decisions Restricting Good Samaritan Immunity 
Other states have narrowly construed their Good Samaritan 
statutes, restricting the immunity the statute offers.  One such 
example is Dahl v. Turner.195  The issue presented in Dahl is 
identical to that of Swenson: does the act of transporting another 
constitute “rendering care?”196  The Dahl court held that 
transporting another did not constitute “rendering care.”197  The 
two cases, however, are factually distinguishable. 
In Dahl the defendant, Mrs. Turner, came upon the scene of 
an accident.198  The plaintiff, Mr. Dahl, had wrecked his car.199  
Other than a cut on his arm, Dahl appeared perfectly normal and 
otherwise uninjured.200  He did not want to go to a doctor, but 
rather to a motel in a nearby city to see a friend.201  Turner 
happened to be going to the same city.202  With Dahl in her car, 
Turner was subsequently involved in an auto accident of her own, 
in which Dahl received further injuries.203  He sued Turner for 
those injuries, and Turner claimed immunity under New Mexico’s 
Good Samaritan statute.204  The court held that “[i]f Mrs. Turner 
was administering ‘care’ in providing transportation to plaintiff, 
such care was not emergency care within the meaning of the 
statute.  There are no facts indicating a pressing necessity for such 
transportation; no facts indicating that the transportation was 
immediately called for.”205 
 
 194. Id. at 1209 n.7. 
 195. Dahl v. Turner, 458 P.2d 816 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969). 
 196. See id. at 824; Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 796 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 197. See Dahl, 458 P.2d at 824. 
 198. Id. at 823. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 818, 823. 
 205. Id. at 824. 
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Clearly the events in Swenson would indicate a “pressing 
necessity” to any passing motorist.206  Perhaps the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals would have held differently had Dahl’s injuries 
been more severe, or if Turner would have provided transportation 
to a place other than a destination to which she also happened to 
be traveling.  Nonetheless, the Dahl decision is an example of 
denying Good Samaritan immunity to an actor in a situation where 
another court probably would have granted the immunity.207 
Two other cases show a narrow interpretation of the applicable 
Good Samaritan statute.  In Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. the Nevada 
Supreme Court strictly read the statute as applying only to those 
who render emergency care to injured persons.208  The defendant 
in Buck was driving his truck at night when he came upon a stalled 
car in the middle of the highway.209  He offered to assist the women 
in the car by alerting other drivers to their presence with his 
headlights.210  The driver of an approaching bus did not realize the 
women’s car was in the middle of the road.  The bus struck the 
women’s car, injuring the occupants.211  The court denied the 
defendant’s claim of Good Samaritan immunity because the 
women were uninjured at the time he offered assistance.212  This 
holding is also far more restrictive than decisions that grant 
immunity to those who merely ask whether any assistance is 
needed213 or turn on safety lights at the scene of an emergency.214 
Finally, in Howell v. City Towing Associates, Inc. a call for help did 
not satisfy the requirement of rendering emergency care.215  The 
defendant tow truck driver gave the elderly plaintiff a ride home 
after the plaintiff had been involved in a car accident.216  Shortly 
after the ride began, the plaintiff went into cardiac arrest.217  The 
 
 206. See Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) (noting that Tiegs came across the accident scene not long after it occurred, 
discovering the victim in a great deal of pain and needing medical assistance). 
 207. Contra McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 2001). 
 208. Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 441 (Nev. 1989). 
 209. Id. at 439. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 441. 
 213. See McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 2001). 
 214. See Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 215. Howell v. City Towing Assocs., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 216. Id. at 729. 
 217. Id. 
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driver called his dispatcher for assistance, and the dispatcher then 
contacted emergency personnel.218  Without much analysis, the 
court simply laid out its reasoning by stating “[w]e can find no basis 
in law for a determination that a person who calls his dispatcher to 
notify EMS is performing emergency care as contemplated by the Good 
Samaritan statute.”219  Perhaps the court would have decided 
differently had the driver contacted medical personnel directly, 
rather than through his dispatcher.  This decision is not aligned 
with Minnesota law, however, because Minnesota’s Good Samaritan 
statute specifically defines reasonable assistance as “obtaining or 
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical 
personnel.”220 
E.  The Role of Policy Concerns 
Because the states’ Good Samaritan statutes are not identical, 
the decision in one state will not necessarily translate into an 
appropriate decision in another state.  Consequently, one must 
ultimately determine the policy interests to be satisfied when 
choosing an out-of-state decision to follow. 
The area of Good Samaritan law is very much a policy-driven 
area because it goes against decades of case law that does not 
recognize any duty to assist in emergencies.221  These statutes take 
on the difficult task of regulating common sense.  For example, 
North Dakota’s Good Samaritan statute provides immunity for “aid 
or assistance necessary or helpful in the circumstances.”222  The 
statute proceeds to define “aid or assistance necessary or helpful in 
the circumstances” as any actions the aider reasonably believed 
were required to prevent injury depending upon the aider’s 
perception.223  One burden that may flow from this type of legislation 
is the evidentiary issue of determining how the actor perceived the 
situation, and then determining what actions the actor reasonably 
believed were necessary to prevent injury. 
If the policy behind Good Samaritan statutes is to encourage 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 731. 
 220. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002). 
 221. Compare § 604A.01 (2002) with Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 
1 (1907). 
 222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02 (2001). 
 223. § 32-03.1-01. 
27
Nowlin: Don't Just Stand There, Help Me!: Broadening the Effect of Minnes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
NOWLIN-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:26 PM 
1028 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
those without a preexisting duty to help to come to another’s aid,224 
then Minnesota courts must address certain issues.  First, courts 
should stress the importance of the reasonableness standard set 
forth in the Good Samaritan statute.225  By granting immunity to 
individuals who act merely by contacting law enforcement or 
medical professionals,226 the courts can encourage others to assist in 
some way, even if they do so with a less-than-heroic act. 
The Swenson court took a step in the right direction by finding 
that transporting an injured person to a hospital constituted 
rendering assistance pursuant to the Good Samaritan statute.227  
This decision operates to decrease the time between the moment 
an injury is sustained in an accident and the time when 
professionals can tend to the injury; a passer-by who sees the victim 
can transport him to a hospital in less time than would be required 
to wait for an emergency vehicle to arrive at the scene and then 
proceed to transport the victim to a hospital.  Continuing to hold 
as such may encourage more individuals to act at the scenes of 
emergencies. 
F.  An Unanswered Question 
The Swenson court left a question unanswered in its analysis of 
the requirements for Good Samaritan immunity.  What if the actor 
does not try to call 911 first in an effort to get professional medical 
care to the scene of the emergency but instead transports the 
victim to the hospital?  This seemed like an important piece of 
information to the Swenson court because the decision twice 
mentions Tiegs’ attempt to call 911.228  However, the court 
conducted no analysis regarding whether such conduct was 
necessary to grant immunity to a volunteer at an emergency. 
The answer would seem to require an actor to try to contact 
medical or law enforcement professionals in all situations if it can 
be done so with relative ease.  The Swenson court seemed to imply 
 
 224. See Veilleux, supra note 41. 
 225. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002). 
 226. § 604A.01, subd. 1. 
 227. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002).  Although Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statute does not clearly include 
transportation of a victim as a protected act, several other states do include such 
an express provision.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 613.17 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:2793 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37(1) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.24.300(1) (West 2003). 
 228. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 796, 800. 
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this with its repeated references to Tiegs’ attempt to contact 
emergency personnel.229  This notion is also consistent with the 
statutory requirement that the actor “give reasonable assistance to 
the exposed person.”230  The fact that an actor does not have 
immediate access to a phone need not preclude granting immunity 
to such actor.  However, if a phone line is available, it seems a call 
should be placed even if only to alert the professionals that the 
actor and victim are en route to the location where further 
professional aid can be rendered. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Minnesota Good Samaritan statute opposes a 
decades-old and commonly-accepted rule that does not require one 
to aid or assist an individual in danger,231 it is a legislative decision 
to eliminate or retain the duty to assist.  The Swenson court was 
required to analyze the existing statute, and correctly decided two 
issues of first impression: first, that Good Samaritan immunity 
should be granted to an actor who merely transports a victim to a 
health care facility; and second, that a brief stop along the way to 
such facility does not negate the seriousness of that emergency. 
Public policy favors a broad interpretation of the immunity 
statute to encourage individuals to act at the scene of an emergency 
even if only by contacting professionals or driving the victim to a 
health care facility.  Such acts will allow medical professionals to 
tend to the victim’s wounds more quickly.  By continuing to 
broadly construe the immunity granted by Minnesota’s Good 
Samaritan statute, individuals will, in time, be more apt to respond 
at the scenes of emergencies without fear of suffering legal 
repercussions for any injuries the victim may suffer due to the 
actor’s negligence. 
 
 
 229. Id.  Apparently the only reason Tiegs decided to take Swenson to the 
hospital instead of allowing an emergency vehicle to transport her was Tiegs’ 
inability to raise a signal on her cell phone.  Id. at 796. 
 230. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subd. 1 (2002).  The statute also defines 
reasonable assistance as including the act of “obtaining or attempting to obtain aid 
from law enforcement or medical personnel.”  Id. 
 231. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.1-2. 
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